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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of dynamic analysis techniques for identify-
ing malware, using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Profile Hidden Markov Models
(PHMMs), both trained on sequences of API calls. We contrast our results to static
analysis using HMMs trained on sequences of opcodes, and show that dynamic analysis
achieves significantly stronger results in many cases. Furthermore, in contrasting our
two dynamic analysis techniques, we find that using PHMMs consistently outperforms
our analysis based on HMMs.
1 Introduction
News stories abound about cyber attacks relating to malware. In 2014, Twitter was at
the receiving end of a major cyber attack. According to news reports, 250,000 users’
email addresses, user names, and passwords were compromised. Twitter was able to
detect the attack by identifying the abnormal patterns in which data was accessed [14].
Target fell victim to a major security breach during the 2013 holiday season, where
credit and debit card details of more than a million customers were compromised. The
information was stolen by hacking the credit card swipe systems at Target stores [10].
This one attack drove down quarterly revenues of Target by tens of millions of dollars [11].
In today’s world of malware and cyber threats, it has become critical to develop
techniques that quickly identify malware. In this paper, we look at different malware
detection techniques and compare their results.
We use the concept of software birthmarks for malware detection. Software birth-
marks are inherent characteristics that can be used to identify particular software [23, 33].
The goal is to obtain a unique identifier for each executable. We can then use these birth-
marks to test the similarity between two executables. If the birthmarks of the two files
are sufficiently similar, then we assume that one software is closely related to the other.
This strategy has been the basis of a variety of techniques for identifying metamorphic
malware with statistical approaches [17, 21, 23, 26, 33, 34, 41, 44].
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Software birthmarks can be either static or dynamic [17]. Static birthmarks are
characteristics that can be extracted from a program without executing it [44]. For
example, a static birthmark can be based on an extracted opcode sequence. In contrast,
dynamic birthmarks are obtained from a program when it is executed [21, 33, 44]. An
example of a dynamic birthmark is the sequence of API calls that occur when a program
is executed [34].
Previous work explored static birthmarks for malware detection [34]; this paper
instead considers dynamic birthmarks. Specifically, we use Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) and Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs) as the bases for our detection
techniques. Both HMM-based analysis [43] and PHMM-based analysis [3] have been
previously applied to the malware detection problem.
To compare the effectiveness of our dynamic analysis techniques, we compare static
and dynamic analysis results on substantial malware datasets using Receiving Operating
Characteristic (ROC) analysis [8]. We show that significantly stronger malware detection
results can be obtained using dynamic analysis of software birthmarks, as compared
to static analysis. Stated another way, our results suggest that it is more beneficial
to consider the API calls used during program execution than to statically analyze the
opcodes in a program. Our work also demonstrates that PHMMs are more effective than
HMMs in malware analysis when considering this particular type of dynamic birthmark.
In our tests, properly tuned PHMMs built from dynamic birthmarks always outperform
HMMs built from the same birthmarks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide back-
ground information on malware and detection techniques. Sections 3 and 4 respectively
cover Hidden Markov Models and Profile Hidden Markov Models. These are the machine
learning techniques used in this paper. Section 5 gives a brief survey of related work
involving these machine learning techniques. In Section 6, we discuss implementation
details. Here, we discuss in detail the tools used for extracting the data, the dataset
used, and the application of the machine learning techniques used. Experiments and dis-
cussion of the results is given in Section 7. Section 8 concludes and we briefly consider
future work.
2 Malware
In this section, we discuss relevant topics related to malware. First, we briefly consider
different types of malware. Then we discuss methods used to obfuscate malware, which
is followed by an overview of some advanced anti-virus techniques. We conclude with a
discussion of software birthmarks, in the context of malware analysis.
2.1 Types of Malware
Malware is a generic term that encompasses viruses, worms, backdoors, and Trojans.
In this section, we discuss the different types of malware in detail. Note that here we
are primarily concerned with the transmission technique of the malware. Section 2.2
2
discusses different obfuscation techniques that might be employed by malware writers,
and could be applied to any of the forms of malware listed here.
“Virus” is perhaps the most overloaded term used for malware—in the vernacular,
virus is a synonym for malware. Technical usage is also sometimes ambiguous. The term
virus is sometimes used to refer to self-replicating malware [32], and by this definition
includes worms, for instance. In this paper we us a stricter definition: a virus is a type
of malware that replicates itself by infecting other files, that is, a virus is parasitic. This
definition seems to be somewhat more common, and is the definition used, for example,
by Cohen [32].
A germ file (the initial malicious program) infects other, benign files and inserts the
virus code into the execution of the benign program. When these infected program are
executed, the virus can insert itself into another generation of victim programs. For
example, Word macro viruses execute when the user opens an infected Word document,
executing their payload and infecting other Word documents [5].
Stuxnet, created in 2010, is a famous examples of a virus. It was primarily developed
to target the industrial control systems used in power plants. This malware attacked
the programmable logic controllers present in the control systems [40].
In subsequent sections, we often use the term virus in its vernacular sense. That is,
we use the terms “virus” and “malware” interchangeably.
A Trojan is malware that looks innocuous to the user, but performs malicious activ-
ities in the background. Unlike a virus, a Trojan is a standalone program. Trojans are
generally not self-replicating in nature and depend on users for their propagation. As
an example, an attacker can create a login program that prompts users to enter their
usernames and passwords. If the user enters his or her credentials, the program steals
the users login credentials and displays an invalid login message and then runs the actual
login program [5]. Trojans can be very harmful, as the user is completely unaware of
the malicious activities that take place in the background. Trojans constitute a major
portion of the today’s malware activity [20].
Worms are defined primarily by their method of propagation; they self-replicate to
different systems through the network [32]. Unlike viruses, worms are not parasitic in
behavior, meaning that they do not alter the instructions of other programs. Worms
have accounted for some well-known malware exploits, including the Morris worm, Code
Red, and SQL Slammer [29].
A backdoor is used to bypass the normal security authentication processes, and could
be installed as the result of a worm or virus. After gaining access, it takes control and
can remotely monitor the system while stealing personal information [5]. An example
for a backdoor malware is Back Orifice. On gaining control of the infected system, this
malware can download, upload, or delete files, lock or shutdown the computer, or even
take control of the keyboard and mouse [6].
2.2 Malware Obfuscation Strategies
Signature-based detection is the most common strategy used by anti-virus products.
This approach involves scanning through the files in a system in search of specific bit
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patterns. An anti-virus product has a database of patterns or signatures, and if a match
is found, then that file is likely to be malware. It is essential that the signature database
be updated frequently; otherwise new malware will go undetected.
Signature detection has long been the main approach used to identify malware,
largely due to its efficiency and low false positive rate. Therefore, virus authors have
worked to change the signature of their malware while still providing the same function-
ality.
Encryption was one of the first obfuscation strategies used by malware writers, and
was seen, for example, in the DOS virus Cascade [13]. By encrypting the body of the
malware with a different key, the signature of the payload will be different. During
execution, the encrypted code can be decrypted and then run normally.
While encrypting the payload of the virus results in a different signature, the virus
must decrypt itself before executing its payload. Therefore, the decryption code may be
identified by signature detection.
Typically, simple encryption techniques are used, since there is little benefit to the
virus user of a strong encryption mechanism. The encryption can be done by means
of a static or a variable key, a simple bitwise rotation, or even by incrementing or
decrementing the bits in the virus body [5]. In choosing a decryption algorithm, the
virus writer might attempt to use an algorithm that can evade signature detection;
more advanced variants of encrypted viruses focus on exactly this problem.
Polymorphic viruses [38] are a variant of encrypted viruses where the decryption
code changes in each generation, unlike the case of encrypted viruses, whose decryption
code remains constant. When executed, polymorphic viruses decrypt and execute their
payload in the same manner as with encrypted viruses. Examples of polymorphic viruses
include Tequila and Maltese [38].
Polymorphic viruses work by mutating the code of the decryption routine, produc-
ing equivalent decryption routines with different instructions, and therefore different
signatures. (We discuss the code mutation techniques in more detail when we review
metamorphic viruses, below.) With a wide array of possible versions of the decryption
code, signature detection is much more difficult, if not impossible [5].
Code emulation is effective for detecting polymorphic malware. The suspect file
is executed for some period of time within a virtual machine until the virus decrypts
itself [22]. At that point, standard signature detection techniques can be applied to the
file in question.
Metamorphic viruses take polymorphic viruses to the logical extreme. Rather than
relying on encryption, morphing techniques are used on the body of the virus; for this
reason, metamorphic viruses are sometimes described as “body polymorphic” [32].
A metamorphic virus makes use of a mutation engine in order to morph its body at
each generation, but the essentially functionality remains unchanged [5]. Metamorphic
viruses can make use of different methods to morph the internal structure. A few of
these methods are discussed below.
1. Dead Code Insertion. This technique is used in many metamorphic viruses. The
idea here is to insert dead code in such a way that it does not alter the functionality
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of the original code. The Win32/Evol virus includes a metamorphic engine that
inserts garbage code [22].
2. Instruction Reordering. This strategy changes the order of instructions, thereby
breaking signatures. As long as no code dependency is broken, instruction reorder-
ing does not affect the functionality of the virus. Instruction reordering can be
used to generate a large number of morphed copies.
3. Instruction Substitution. This approach involves replacing a group of instructions
with equivalent instructions. The functionality of the malware remains unchanged,
but the morphed versions can evade signature detection [5].
4. Register Swapping. In this technique, the virus body is morphed by swapping
operand registers with different registers. Though the virus body is mutated, this
technique does not change the opcode sequence. The W95/Regswap virus uses
register swapping [22].
2.3 Anti-Virus Techniques
In the face of increasingly effective techniques for evading signature detection, advanced
detection strategies have been developed. In this section, we review some of these
approaches.
Unlike signature based detection, static heuristics analysis does not identify malware
by scanning for specific signatures. Instead, it analyses the behavior, structure, and
other attributes for virus-like qualities [5]. This technique can be used to identify zero-
day malware as well as existing malware. This method identifies the probability of a file
being infected by performing an analysis of the instructions, the logic of the program,
the data used, and the overall structure of the binary file it scans. While static heuristics
analysis has the ability to detect malware even before they can infect the computer, they
tend to have a high false positive rate [39].
A behavior blocker executes the program and closely monitors it for suspicious activi-
ties. If any suspicious activity is encountered, the behavior blocker stops the program [5].
Behavior blockers make use of dynamic signatures, which are created by collecting during
program execution.
In general, dynamic detection techniques only consider the instructions that have
actually been executed. Dead code insertion, for example, has no impact on dynamic
analysis. Consequently, we can view dynamic analysis as stripping away one layer of
obfuscation. However, the tradeoff is that dynamic analysis is based only on the parts
of the code that execute.
Unlike behavior blockers, emulators do not run the malware directly on the system.
Instead, they execute the code in an emulated environment. Emulators make use of
dynamic heuristics, which collect information about the malware that is being executed
in the emulated environment. Given the fact that dynamic heuristics closely monitor the
operating system, they have a significant advantage over static heuristics in detecting
malware that targets operating systems. On the negative side, the CPU emulation
process is much slower compared to signature scanning, and hence the dynamic heuristics
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is slower than static heuristics. Also some viruses attempt to hide their infection logic
from the emulator by performing the infection only under specific conditions [39].
2.4 Software Birthmarks
Software birthmarks are characteristics that are derived from a particular software.
There are two types of birthmarks—static and dynamic. Static birthmarks are char-
acteristics that can be extracted from the program itself without executing it. For ex-
ample, opcodes sequences can be considered a static birthmark for a program. Dynamic
birthmarks are characteristics that are obtained from a program when it is executed.
For example, API calls that are recorded when the program is executed could serve as
a dynamic birthmark. Next, we briefly discuss examples of analysis techniques that use
static and dynamic birthmarks for malware detection
As previously mentioned, static analysis involves analyzing the program without
executing it. In [26], static analysis is performed by extracting opcode sequences with
the help of a disassembler. The key advantage of static analysis is that it is relatively
faster and efficient. Compared to dynamic analysis techniques, it is also safer since it
does not involve execution of the malware. The drawback of a static approach is that it
may be defeated by code obfuscation techniques [5].
In [23], the authors propose a static k-gram based birthmark. This birthmark is
computed by extracting opcode sequences of length k. The effectiveness of this birth-
mark is tested on randomly selected applications and on programs that are semantically
different, but which accomplish the same task. The authors identify an optimum k value
at which the credibility and resilience of the birthmark is maximized.
Dynamic analysis is performed to extract dynamic software birthmarks. Dynamic
birthmarks, such as API calls obtained at runtime, can be difficult for malware writers to
defeated [33], since dynamic birthmarks are resilient to code obfuscation when compared
to static birthmarks. The tradeoff is that the cost of dynamic analysis is generally higher
and there is risk involved in executing the malware.
In [7], the authors construct a k-gram based birthmark by traversing a window of
length k over an opcode sequence in the case of the static analysis and over an executable
trace for the dynamic analysis case. The authors evaluated the strength of the dynamic
birthmark technique by comparing the results obtained from static and dynamic cases
when code obfuscation is applied. They show that the dynamic k-gram birthmark is
much more robust than the static case.
Anderson [2] discusses a graph based technique in which a graph is constructed
by collecting dynamic instruction traces. The constructed graphs are Markov chains
consisting of instructions and transition probabilities. A similarity matrix is created
using the graph kernels for different instruction traces. A Support Vector Machine is
applied to the similarity matrix to perform the malware classification. The author of [2]
shows that this technique is an improvement over previous work.
Tamada et al. [33] use both the API call sequences and the API call frequencies that
are collected during runtime as dynamic birthmarks. The authors leverage the fact that
different programs using the same APIs do not have the same order of API calls upon
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execution.
Fukuda et al. [17] consider the operand stack runtime behavior of a Java Virtual
Machine. This is a dynamic birthmark, due to its unique nature at runtime. This
birthmark exhibits high tolerance to code changes and a good ability to discern programs
that could be a pirated version of another.
It is evident from the works above that dynamic birthmarks have some inherent
advantages as compared to their static counterparts. Our work consists of developing
and analyzing malware detection strategies based on dynamic birthmarks and using
Hidden Markov Models and Profile Hidden Markov Models for classification.
3 Hidden Markov Models
In this section, we discuss Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) in some detail. HMMs
have proven useful in a wide array of fields, including speech recognition [25], malware
detection [43], and software piracy analysis [26]. In this paper, we apply HMMs to the
problem of malware detection based on software birthmarks.
A Markov process of order one is a memoryless process where the current state
depends only on the prvious state. In a Hidden Markov Model, the state is hidden, in
the sense that it cannot be directly observed. However, we do have observations that
depend (probabilistically) on the hidden states.
O0 O1 O2 · · · OT−1
X0 X1 X2 · · · XT−1
A A A A
B B B B
Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model.
Each state of an HMM has an associated probability distribution over the set of
possible observations. Since we have a Markov process, the transition probabilities
between the states are fixed. For our research we train an HMM using observation
sequences from malware samples belonging to a given family. After training, we can score
any given observation sequence against the trained HMM to determine the likelihood
of the sequence belonging to the same family that was used to train the HMM. A high
probability indicates the scored sample closely matches the sequence used to train the
HMM [28].
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We use the standard notation in Table 1 in our discussion of HMMs. The matrices A,
Table 1: HMM Notation
notation explanation
T length of the observation sequence
N number of states in the model
M number of observation symbols
Q distinct states, {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1}
V set of possible observations, {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}
A state transition probabilities
B observation probability matrix
pi initial state distribution
O observation sequence (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1)
B, and pi provide all relevant information about the model and hence we denote an HMM
as λ = (A,B, pi).
Figure 1 provides a generic illustration of an HMM. In Figure 1, the Xi represent
the hidden states. The (hidden) Markov process is determined by the A matrix and
the present state. The observations Oi are known and are related to the hidden states
by the B matrix. Hence, we can indirectly obtain information about the hidden states
from the observation sequence and the B matrix. The matrices A, B and pi are all row
stochastic, that is, each row satisfies the conditions of a discrete probability distribution.
HMMs are useful primarily because there exist efficient algorithms to solve each of
the following three problems [28].
Problem 1 — Given a model λ = (A,B, pi) and an observation sequence O, deter-
mine P (O |λ). That is, we can score a given observation sequence against a given
model.
Problem 2 — Given a model λ = (A,B, pi) and an observation sequence O, determine
an optimal state sequence for the underlying Markov model. That is, we can “uncover”
the most likely hidden state sequence.
Problem 3 — Given a observation sequence O we can generate a model λ = (A,B, pi)
such that P (O |λ) is maximized. That is, we can train a model to fit a given observations
sequence.
Next, we discuss the solution to each of these three problems. For additional details,
see the tutorial [28] or Rabiner’s classic introduction [25].
Solution to Problem 1—Let λ = (A,B, pi) be a given model and letO = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1)
be a series of observations. We want to find P (O |λ).
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Let X = (x0, x1, . . . , xT−1) be a state sequence. Then by the definition of B we have
P (O |X,λ) = bx0(O0)bx1(O1) · · · bxT−1(OT−1)
and by the definition of pi and A it follows that
P (X |λ) = pix0ax0,x1ax1,x2 · · · axT−2,xT−1 .
Since
P (O,X |λ) =
P (O ∩X ∩ λ)
P (λ)
and
P (O |X,λ)P (X |λ) =
P (O ∩X ∩ λ)
P (X ∩ λ)
·
P (X ∩ λ)
P (λ)
=
P (O ∩X ∩ λ)
P (λ)
we have
P (O,X |λ) = P (O |X,λ)P (X |λ).
By summing over all possible state sequences we obtain
P (O |λ) =
∑
X
P (O,X |λ)
=
∑
X
P (O |X,λ)P (X |λ) (1)
=
∑
X
pix0bx0(O0)ax0,x1bx1(O1) · · · (2)
· · · axT−2,xT−1bxT−1(OT−1).
However, this direct computation is generally computationally infeasible.
To compute P (O |λ) efficiently, the so-called forward algorithm is used. For t =
0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
αt(i) = P (O0,O1, . . . ,Ot, xt = qi |λ). (3)
Then αt(i) is the probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t, where the
underlying Markov process is in state qi at time t.
The αt(i) can be computed recursively as follows.
1. Let α0(i) = piibi(O0), for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1
2. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
αt(i) =
(
N−1∑
j=0
αt−1(j)aji
)
bi(Ot)
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3. Then from (3), we have
P (O |λ) =
N−1∑
i=0
αT−1(i).
The forward algorithm only requires about N2T multiplications, as opposed to more
than 2TNT for the na¨ıve approach.
Solution to Problem 2 — Given the model λ = (A,B, pi) and a sequence of ob-
servations O, we can find the most likely state sequence. There are different possible
interpretations of “most likely.” For HMMs, “most likely” means that we maximize the
expected number of correct states.
In analogy to the forward algorithm, we define the backward algorithm as follows.
Let
βt(i) = P (Ot+1,Ot+2, . . . ,OT−1 |xt = qi, λ)
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N−1. Then the βt(i) can be computed recursively
(and efficiently) using the following algorithm.
1. Let βT−1(i) = 1, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
2. For t = T − 2, T − 3, . . . , 0 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 compute
βt(i) =
N−1∑
j=0
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j).
Next, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
γt(i) = P (xt = qi | O, λ).
Since αt(i) measures the relevant probability up to time t and βt(i) measures the relevant
probability after time t, we have
γt(i) =
αt(i)βt(i)
P (O |λ)
.
As noted above, the denominator P (O |λ) is obtained by summing αT−1(i) over i. From
the definition of γt(i) it follows that the most likely state at time t is the state qi for
which γt(i) is maximum, where the maximum is taken over the index i.
Solution to Problem 3 — We want to adjust the model parameters to best fit the
observations. The sizes of the matrices (N and M) are specified, but the elements of A,
B and pi are to be determined, subject to the row stochastic conditions. The fact that
we can efficiently re-estimate the model itself is perhaps the most impressive aspect of
HMMs.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 and i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, define “di-gammas” as
γt(i, j) = P (xt = qi, xt+1 = qj | O, λ).
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Then γt(i, j) is the probability of being in state qi at time t and transiting to state qj at
time t+ 1. The di-gammas can be written in terms of α, β, A and B as
γt(i, j) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
P (O |λ)
.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2, the γt(i) and γt(i, j) are related by
γt(i) =
N−1∑
j=0
γt(i, j).
Given the γ and di-gamma, the model λ = (A,B, pi) can be re-estimated as follows.
1. For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, let
pii = γ0(i) (4)
2. For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
aij =
T−2∑
t=0
γt(i, j)
/ T−2∑
t=0
γt(i). (5)
3. For j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, compute
bj(k) =
∑
t∈{0,1,...,T−1}
Ot=k
γt(j)
/ T−1∑
t=0
γt(j). (6)
The numerator of the re-estimated aij is the expected number of transitions from
state qi to state qj, while the denominator is the expected number of transitions from qi
to any state. The ratio of these two quantities is the probability of transiting from
state qi to state qj, which is our best estimate for aij.
The numerator of the re-estimated bj(k) is the expected number of times the model
is in state qj and we observe symbol k, while the denominator is the expected number
of times the model is in state qj. The ratio is the probability of observing k, given that
the model is in state qj. This ratio is our best estimate for bj(k).
Re-estimation is an iterative process. Typically, we initialize λ = (A,B, pi) with
random values such that pii ≈ 1/N and aij ≈ 1/N and bj(k) ≈ 1/M . It is critical
that A, B and pi be randomized, since exactly uniform values will result in a local
maximum and the model will fail to climb. The matrices pi, A and B must be initialized
to be row stochastic.
The solution to Problem 3 can be summarized as follows.
1. Initialize, λ = (A,B, pi).
2. Compute αt(i), βt(i), γt(i, j) and γt(i).
3. Re-estimate the model λ = (A,B, pi).
4. If P (O |λ) increases, goto 2.
In Section 6, we discuss how we use HMMs in the experiments considered in this paper.
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4 Profile Hidden Markov Models
In this section we introduce Profile Hidden Markov Models. Note that in a Hidden
Markov Model, the positional information within the observation sequence is not rele-
vant. A PHMM can be viewed as an HMM that takes this positional information into
account. In addition, a PHMM accounts for possible insertions and deletions within the
observation sequence, which is not the case with a standard HMM.
Not surprisingly, PHMMs are more complex to describe than HMMs. Hence, we do
not provide quite as much detail in this section as we did in the previous section.
4.1 Overview and Notation
First, we consider state transitions within a PHMM. That is, we want to determine the
PHMM equivalent of the A matrix in an HMM.
Generically, a PHMM includes match (M), insert (I), and delete (D) states, as
illustrated in Figure 2. This illustration is essentially the PHMM equivalent of the hidden
states (and transitions) in the HMM illustration in Figure 1. That is, the complicated
illustration in Figure 2 is just the state transitions of the PHMM, and does not directly
include information related to the emissions (i.e., observations). That is, nothing in this
figure that corresponds to the B matrix in the HMM.
begin M1 M2 M3 M4 end
I0 I1 I2 I3 I4
D1 D2 D3 D4
Figure 2: Profile Hidden Markov Model
For a PHMM, the standard notation [12] is summarized in Table 2. It may be
instructive to compare the PHMM notation in Table 2 to the HMM notation that is
given in Table 1.
Next, we turn our attention to generating pairwise alignments. Then we consider the
process of generating a multiple sequence alignment (MSA) from a collection of pairwise
alignments, and we discuss the process used to generate the PHMM matrices from an
MSA. As mentioned above, generating the MSA is the most challenging step in the
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Table 2: PHMM Notation
notation explanation
X sequence of emitted symbols, x1, x2, . . . , xi
N number of states
M match states, M1,M2, . . . ,MN
I insert states, I1, I2, . . . , IN
D delete states, D1, D2, . . . , DN
pi initial state distribution
A state transition probability matrix
aMiMi+1 transition probability from Mi to Mi+1
E emission probability matrix
εMi(k) emission probability of symbol k at state Mi
λ the PHMM, λ = (A,E, pi)
training process. Finally, we consider the scoring process using a PHMM. The scoring
procedure for a PHMM uses a similar process as is used in an HMM.
4.2 Pairwise Alignment
We require a method to align a pair of sequences from the training set. Ideally, we would
like to globally align a pair of sequences, that is, we want an alignment that accounts for
all elements in both sequences. However, we also want to minimize the number of gaps
that are inserted, since gaps tend to weaken the resulting PHMM by making it more
generic. By using a local alignment strategy instead of a global approach, we can often
significantly reduce the number of gaps. The tradeoff is that a local alignment strategy
does not utilize all of the information available in the sequences.
To simplify the local alignment problem, we only consider such alignments where the
initial and ending parts of the sequences can remain unaligned. For example, suppose
that we want to align the sequences
CBCBJILIIJEJE and GCBJIIIJJEG.
In Table 3 we give a global alignment, along with a local alignment, where the initial and
final parts of the sequences are not aligned. Note that we use “-” to represent an inserted
gap, while “*” is an omitted symbol, that is, a symbol omitted from consideration in
the local alignment. Also, “|” indicates the corresponding elements are aligned.
For the global alignment in Table 3, we are able to align 9 out of 15 of the positions
(60%), while for the local alignment, we have aligned 8 of the 10 positions (80%) under
consideration. Consequently, model based on this local alignment is likely to be stronger
than a model based on the global alignment. Therefore, we consider local alignments of
the type illustrated in Table 3. However, to simplify the presentation, in the remainder
of this section, we illustrate global alignments. To obtain optimal local alignments,
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Table 3: Global versus Local Alignment
unaligned sequences CBCBJILIIJEJE
GCBJIIIJJEG
global alignment -CBCBJILIIJEJE-
| ||| ||| ||
GC--BJI-IIJ-JEG
local alignment ***CBJILII-JE**
|||| || ||
***CBJI-IIJJE**
we could simply repeat the alignment process several times, omitting symbols at the
beginning and end of the sequences.
To construct a pairwise alignment, it is standard practice to use dynamic program-
ming. In the context of sequence alignment, we specify an n× n substitution matrix S,
where n is the number of symbols under consideration, and a gap penalty function g.
The substitution matrix specifies the cost associated with aligning various symbols with
each other, while g specifies the penalty incurred when opening (or extending) a gap.
Once S and g have been specified, the dynamic program is relatively straightforward.
For the sake of brevity, we omit further details on pairwise alignment. For more in-
formation on sequence alignment within the context of a PHMM, see Chapter 3 of the
tutorial [30].
4.3 Multiple Sequence Alignment
Given a set of training sequences, we construct pairwise alignments for all pairs. From
these pairwise alignments, we want to construct a multiple sequence alignment. Con-
structing the MSA is essentially the training process for a PHMM.
For efficiency, a progressive alignment strategy is generally used to construct the
MSA. That is, we start with one pair of aligned sequence and merge it with another
aligned pair, and merge that result with another, and so on. In this way, at each step
we include more sequences into the MSA, until all training sequences have been used.
The advantage of a progressive approach is that it is far more efficient than trying to
align multiple sequences simultaneously. The disadvantage of a progressive alignment
strategy is that it is likely to be unstable, in the sense that the order in which the pairwise
alignments are considered can have a major impact on the resulting MSA. Specifically,
the order can affect the number of gaps that are inserted into the MSA, and it is always
desirable to minimize gaps.
There are many progressive alignment techniques available. Here, we discuss an
approach based on the Feng-Dolittle algorithm, as used in [3]. To construct an MSA, we
proceed as follows, where we assume that we are given as set of n training sequences, a
substitution matrix S and a gap penalty function g.
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1. Compute pairwise alignments for all
(
n
2
)
pairs of sequences in the training set, using
dynamic programming. For each pairwise alignment, we obtain a score from the
dynamic program.
2. Select a set of n − 1 pairwise alignments that includes all n sequences from the
original training set, and maximizes the sum of the pairwise alignment scores.
3. Generate a minimum spanning tree (using Prim’s algorithm) for these n−1 pairwise
alignments, based on the pairwise alignment scores.
4. Add pairwise alignments to the MSA based on the spanning tree (from highest score
to lowest score), inserting additional gaps as needed. The gap penalty function g
is used when inserting gaps.
For example, suppose we have 10 training sequences which result in the pairwise
alignment scores in Table 4, where element (i, j) is the score obtained for the pairwise
alignment of sequence i with sequence j.
Table 4: Example Pairwise Alignment Scores
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 — 85 63 74 70 84 61 57 62 70
2 85 — 79 73 66 59 94 61 59 51
3 63 79 — 75 68 60 55 85 52 65
4 74 73 75 — 105 54 60 78 59 53
5 70 66 68 105 — 40 61 79 58 39
6 84 59 60 54 40 — 68 45 75 78
7 61 94 55 60 61 68 — 64 72 42
8 57 61 85 78 79 45 64 — 50 70
9 62 59 52 59 58 75 72 50 — 81
10 70 51 65 53 39 78 42 70 81 —
We then select a set of 9 of these pairs so that each sequence 1, 2, . . . , 10 is included
at least once, while maximizing the sum of the scores. Using the scores in Table 4, the
set
{(4, 5), (2, 7), (1, 2), (3, 8), (1, 6), (9, 10), (2, 3), (5, 8), (6, 10)}
satisfies these requirements. The minimum spanning tree corresponding to these pairwise
alignments is given in Figure 3, where the nodes are labeled with the training sequence
number, and the edges are labeled with pairwise alignment scores.
Using this procedure, we construct a minimum spanning tree that includes every
sequence in the training set. This spanning tree will be used to generate the MSA
which, in turn, is used to generate the PHMM.
To generate an MSA from a minimum spanning tree, such as that in Figure 3, we
start with the pairwise alignment at the root. Then we traverse the tree, adding the
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Figure 3: Minimum Spanning Tree
specified new sequence into the alignment at each step. For the example in Figure 3, we
consider the pairwise alignments in the order
(5, 4), (5, 8), (8, 3), (3, 2), (2, 7), (2, 1), (1, 6), (6, 10), and (10, 9).
With the exception of the initial pair, one new sequence is added to the MSA at each
step.
Again referring to the example in Figure 3, one step in the MSA construction is given
in Table 5, At this particular step, we have already included sequences 5, 4, 8, and 3,
based on the pairwise alignments
(5, 4), (5, 8), and (8, 3)
and we are adding sequence 2 based on the pairwise alignment (3, 2). Note that at these
intermediate steps, we have used “+” to represent gaps that are inserted to align the
new sequence with the existing MSA, as opposed to “-” which we use for gaps in the
pairwise alignments. The final MSA appears in Table 6, where all gaps are represented
by “-” symbols.
4.4 PHMM from MSA
A PHMM is determined directly from an MSA, that is, the probabilities in the matrices
in λ = (A,E, pi) are determined from the MSA. The process might look somewhat
complex, but it is actually straightforward, since probabilities are based only on counts
of elements that appear in the MSA. First, we consider the emission probability matrix E,
then we turn our attention to the state transition matrix A.
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Table 5: Snapshots of MSA Construction
MSA at intermediate step
seq. alignment
5 CDABBAFCDB1AAEAA+CEDA+EQ+CDABABABALF4
4 2AABBAFCDABA+EAABCEDCDEQFCDABA+APALF4
8 ++AABA+CDB+AAEAA+CEDCDEQ+CDABPBA+ABF4
3 A+ABBAFCDABA+EAA+CEDCDEQA++ABFBAN++F4
Next pairwise alignment
seq. alignment
2 A-ABNBAFCD-BAAEAABCEDA-EQ-CDABAB--BAF4
3 A+AB-BAFCDABA+EAA+CEDCDEQA++ABFBAN++F4
MSA after including sequence 2
seq. alignment
5 CDAB+BAFCDB1AAEAA+CEDA+EQ+CDABABABALF4
4 2AAB+BAFCDABA+EAABCEDCDEQFCDABA+APALF4
8 ++AA+BA+CDB+AAEAA+CEDCDEQ+CDABPBA+ABF4
3 A+AB+BAFCDABA+EAA+CEDCDEQA++ABFBAN++F4
2 A+ABNBAFCD+BAAEAABCEDA+EQ+CDABAB++BAF4
Table 6: Final MSAseq. alignment
1 A-AB-BAFCD-B-AAEA0ACEDA-EQ---A-ABCDBALF4
2 A-ABNBAFCD-B-AAEAABCEDA-EQ-CDABAB--BA-F4
3 A-AB-BAFCDAB-A-EAA-CEDCDEQA--ABFBAN---F4
4 2AAB-BAFCDAB-A-EAABCEDCDEQFCDABA-APAL-F4
5 CDAB-BAFCDB1-AAEAA-CEDA-EQ-CDABABABAL-F4
6 CDABAAA----B-A-EA-ACEDCDEQ---A-ABCD-A-F4
7 CDAB--A-CDAB-A-EAA-CEDA-EQ-CDABCDCDAA-F4
8 --AA-BA-CDB--AAEAA-CEDCDEQ-CDABPBA-AB-F4
9 CDAB--RBAFABPAAEA-ACEDCDEQAABCDAFAL---F4
10 A-ABAA-----B-AAEA-ACEDCDEQAABAFA------F4
Recall that the PHMM includes match (M), insert (I), and delete (D) states. We
define “conservative” columns of the MSA as those for which half or less of the elements
are gaps. Conservative columns correspond to match states of the PHMM. In contrast,
if the majority of elements in a column are gaps, the column represents an insert state.
The delete states will be considered later.
Consider the simple MSA in Table 7, which only includes the four symbols, C, E, G,
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and J. Note that columns 1, 2 and 6 are conservative, and hence correspond to match
states. Columns 3, 4, and 5 are not conservative. Consecutive non-conservative columns
are treated as a single insert state.
Table 7: MSA Example
E
E
–
E
E
1
M1
C
C
C
G
G
2
M2 I2
–
–
G
–
–
3
–
E
E
–
–
4
–
–
J
J
–
5
–
G
G
G
G
6
M3
Emissions occur at match and insert states. The probabilities in the E matrix are
determined from the MSA based on the counts in each state. Referring to the MSA in
Table 7, for column 1 we have
εM1(E) = 4/4, εM1(G) = eM1(C) = eM1(J) = 0/4 (7)
since all 4 of the (non-gap) symbols that appear are E.
Any model that includes probabilities of zero is prone to overfit the training data,
since “nearby” sequences are eliminated. Several standard methods are available to
eliminate zero probabilities. Here, we employ the “add-one rule” [12] which, consists of
adding one to each numerator and, so as to maintain probabilities, also adding the total
number of symbols to each denominator. Since there are four distinct symbols in our
example, applying the add-one rule to the probabilities in equation (7) yields
εM1(E) = 5/8, εM1(G) = εM1(C) = εM1(J) = 1/8.
For the insert state I2, the natural probabilities are
εI2(E) = 2/5, εI2(G) = 1/5, εI2(C) = 0/5, εI2(J) = 2/5
which come from the ratios of the emitted symbols in the dashed box in Table 7. Using
the add-one rule, the insert state probabilities become
εI2(E) = 3/9, εI2(G) = 2/9, εI2(C) = 1/9, εI2(J) = 3/9.
The emission probabilities for the example in Table 7, with the add-one rule applied,
are given Table 8. Note that for states for which we have no information (e.g., I1 in this
example), we assume a uniform distribution.
Intuitively, it might seem that the more sequences we use for training, the stronger
the resulting model, since more sequences provide more information. However, by using
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Table 8: Emission Probabilities for the MSA in Table 7
εM1(E) = 5/8 εI1(E) = 1/4
εM1(G) = 1/8 εI1(G) = 1/4
εM1(C) = 1/8 εI1(C) = 1/4
εM1(J) = 1/8 εI1(J) = 1/4
εM2(E) = 1/9 εI2(E) = 3/9
εM2(G) = 3/9 εI2(G) = 2/9
εM2(C) = 4/9 εI2(C) = 1/9
εM2(J) = 1/9 εI2(J) = 3/9
εM3(E) = 1/8 εI3(E) = 1/4
εM3(G) = 5/8 εI3(G) = 1/4
εM3(C) = 1/8 εI3(C) = 1/4
εM3(J) = 1/8 εI3(J) = 1/4
more training sequences, we are likely to have more gaps in the resulting MSA, which
tends to weaken the model. Consequently, the number of sequences used to generate the
MSA is a critical parameter that we can analyze via experimentation.
Next, we consider the transition probabilities, that is, we show how to derive the state
transition probabilities from an MSA. Again, we illustrate the process using simple MSA
in Table 7.
Intuitively, the probabilities should be given by
amn =
transitions from state m to state n
total transitions from state m to any state
. (8)
As with emission probabilities, we want to avoid probabilities of zero, so we will use the
add-one rule.
Let B be the begin state. Then, ignoring the add-one rule,
aBM1 = 4/5 (9)
since four of the five elements in column 1 are matches, which implies that the probability
of transitioning from the begin state to M1 is 4/5.. Similarly,
aBD1 = 1/5 and aBI0 = 0/5 (10)
since one element in column 1 represents delete state D1 and insert state I0 is empty.
As with the emission probability calculations, we use the add-one rule. However,
instead of adding one for each symbol, we add one for each possible transition, namely,
match, insert, and delete. Thus, using the add-one rule, equations (9) and (10) become
aBM1 = 5/8, aBD1 = 2/8, and aBI0 = 1/8
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respectively.
As with the emission probabilities, in cases where there is no data, we set the tran-
sition probabilities to uniform. For example, we have no transitions from I1, and conse-
quently
aI1M2 = aI1I1 = aI1D2 = 1/3.
Next, consider the delete state D1, which corresponds to the “dash” in column 1 of
Table 7. We see that the transition from D1 is to a match state in column 2. Conse-
quently,
aD1M2 = 2/4, aD1I1 = 1/4, and aD1D2 = 1/4
where we have used the add-one rule.
Now consider M2. In the bottom row, no letter appears in the boxed region of the
MSA in Table 7 and, consequently, for this row, we transition fromM2 toM3. Similarly,
in the top row, we transition from M2 to D3. However, the three middle rows all go
from M2 to I3. Therefore, using the add-one rule, we have
aM2M3 = 2/8, aM2D3 = 2/8, and aM2I3 = 4/8.
Finally, we calculate transition probabilities for I2. Note that there are five symbols
in I2, and of these, three transition to M3, namely, the E in the second row, the J in the
third row, and the J in the fourth row. Both of the remaining symbols (G and E in the
third row) transition to symbols in I2. Therefore,
aI2M3 = 4/8, aI2I2 = 3/8, and aI2D3 = 1/8.
The complete set of transition probabilities for the MSA in Table 7 appears in Table 9.
Note that the add-one rule has been applied in all cases.
Table 9: Transition Probabilities for the MSA in Table 7
aBM1 = 5/8 aI0M1 = 1/3
aBI0 = 1/8 aI0I0 = 1/3
aBD1 = 2/8 aI0D1 = 1/3
aM1M2 = 5/7 aI1M2 = 1/3 aD1M2 = 2/4
aM1I1 = 1/7 aI1I1 = 1/3 aD1I1 = 1/4
aM1D2 = 1/7 aI1D2 = 1/3 aD1D2 = 1/4
aM2M3 = 2/8 aI2M3 = 4/8 aD2M3 = 1/3
aM2I2 = 4/8 aI2I2 = 3/8 aD2I2 = 1/3
aM2D3 = 2/8 aI2D3 = 1/8 aD2D3 = 1/3
aM3E = 5/6 aI3E = 1/2 aD3E = 2/3
aM3I3 = 1/6 aI3I3 = 1/2 aD3I3 = 1/3
To conclude this section, we summarize the process used to training a PHMM. Here,
we assume that we are given a set of training sequences and that a substitution matrix S
and gap penalty function g have been specified.
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1. Construct pairwise alignments for the training sequences using S and g. Typically,
dynamic programming is used in this step.
2. From the pairwise alignments, construct an MSA. There are many ways to con-
struct an MSA from pairwise alignments—in this paper, we used a spanning tree
and a progressive alignment strategy.
3. Use the MSA to determine the PHMM, that is, the probabilities that constitute λ =
(A,E, pi) are determined directly from the MSA. To avoid zero probabilities, use
some form of pseudo-counts, such as the add-one rule.
To score a given sequence against a specific PHMM, we use the forward algorithm.
The PHMM version of the forward algorithm is fairly similar to the forward algorithm as
used for scoring in HMMs, so we omit the details here; see [30] for additional information.
5 Related Work
Wong and Stamp [43] showed the effectiveness of HMMs for detecting metamorphic
malware based on opcode sequences. Austin et al. [4] extend this idea to a dueling
HMM strategy, that is, a multi-sensor approach that handles more complex viruses by
using models of both benign and malicious files. Kalbhor et al. [19] highlight how the
overhead of the dueling HMM strategy can be reduced to levels approaching that of
Wong and Stamp’s approach by using a tiered analysis. The central idea in [19] is to
quickly analyze files with the simpler approach first, and only use the more expensive
multi-sensor approach in the more difficult cases. Annachhatre et al. [1] show how this
multi-sensor approach can be useful in the classification of malware, based on clustering.
Filiol and Josse [16] discuss statistical testing simulability and describe how an at-
tacker might use information about the defender’s detection strategy to evade detection.
Madenur Sridhara and Stamp [31] use a similar strategy in the design of an experi-
mental metamorphic worm MWOR. The MWOR worm relies primarily on dead code
insertion, which seems to be one of the more effective metamorphic techniques at evading
HMM-based detection that is based on static analysis.
Attaluri et al. [3] use profile hidden Markov models to detect metamorphic malware
based on static opcode sequences. The approach works well against certain kinds of
metamorphic malware, but seems to be less effective when the blocks of code are shifted
farther apart. This paper continues this work by instead considering dynamic birth-
marks. While PHMMs trained on static data have not proven particularly useful for
malware detection [3], their positional information seems more likely to be beneficial
when training on dynamic birthmarks.
6 Implementation
In this section, we review the design of each of our systems. First, we discuss our
HMM-based approach, then we turn our attention to our PHMM-based technique.
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6.1 Static Analysis Using HMMs
We begin with our system using HMMs and static birthmarks for malware analysis.
As mentioned previously, this strategy has been used with some success in the litera-
ture [43, 4], but it can be defeated by malware that inserts dead-code as an obfuscation
technique [31].
Following past research for static HMM analysis [43], we use opcodes as our static
birthmarks. We use IDA Pro to disassemble the malware and generate asm files. From
those files, we extract the mnemonic opcodes for training and testing our models. Labels,
operands, and other details are discarded.
We construct the HMMs from these sequences. Following the approach taken by
Wong and Stamp [43], we use N = 2 two hidden states. We also use 800 iterations of
the Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm when training all of our models. We use five-
fold cross-validation. That is, for each experiment, the family dataset is partitioned into
five equal subsets, say, S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5. Then we train a model using S1, S2, S3,
and S4, and we use the resulting model to score S5 as well as the representative benign
set. This process is repeated five times, with a different subset reserved for testing in
each “fold”. The use of cross validation serves to smooth any biases in the data, while
also maximizing the number of scores from a given dataset.
6.2 Dynamic Analysis Using HMMs
To compare the effectiveness of dynamic versus static analysis, we also consider a HMM
analysis based on dynamic birthmarks. For the dynamic birthmark, we extract API calls
at runtime. One useful advantage of this approach is that API calls would seem to more
closely capture the actual functionality of the program than the opcodes, potentially
making it a more resilient tool against various code obfuscation techniques.
To collect the API calls, we use the Buster Sandbox Analyzer [9] (BSA). BSA logs
information about file system changes, windows registry changes, port changes, etc. BSA
also executes files in a sandbox so that malware can be run safely.
Once the API call sequences are produced, they are used for training and testing
in the same manner as discussed in Section 6.1. We note that there is an additional
parameter in this case, namely, the amount of time that we run the software to generate
the sequences.
6.3 Dynamic Analysis Using PHMMs
Here, we use the same API call sequences as in the dynamic HMM case. Once we have
the sequences of API calls for a given malware family, we align the sequences. Some
amount of preprocessing is required in this step. We followed the general approach
in [3], that is, the API calls are first sorted by the frequency of occurrence. In our data,
the top 36 API calls constitute at least 99.8% of the total API calls for each family
tested. Consequently, we only consider the top 36 API calls, with all remaining API
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calls mapped to a single “other” state. This preprocessing step strengthens the resulting
models.
The next step involves creating a substitution matrix and a gap penalty function. As
described in Section 4, we use a the Feng-Doolittle algorithm [15] to create our multiple
sequence alignment (MSA). After constructing the MSA, we use it to build the PHMM,
as discussed in Section 4. Once we have built the PHMM, we use the forward algorithm
to score sequences against the PHMM.
7 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our dynamic and static analysis tech-
niques and present our results. Specifically, we use a static HMM analysis based on
extracted opcodes as a baseline to compare against both HMMs and PHMMs trained
on dynamically extracted API call sequences.
7.1 Setup
For all experiments, we have used the Oracle VM Virtual Box. The host machine has
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU@1.7Ghz processor, 6GB RAM, 64-bit system, and
Windows 8.1 operating system. The guest machine used in our experiments was an
Oracle Virtual Box 4.3.16 VM with a base memory of 3310MB, 6 GB RAM, 32 bit
system, running Windows 7. The training and testing of the HMMs and PHMM are
done in the host machine whereas the API calls and opcode extraction are done in the
guest machine.
7.2 Dataset
For our malware set, we have considered the following seven different malware fami-
lies [24].
• Cridex is a worm that multiplies and spreads through removable drives. It down-
loads malicious programs onto the system it has attacked [35].
• Harebot is a backdoor that affects Windows systems. The Harebot backdoor enables
hackers to gain access to the compromised system and steal information [18].
• Security Shield is fake anti-virus software that falsely claims to protect the system
from malware. Security Shield then tries to convince the user to pay money to
remove these nonexistent threats [27].
• SmartHdd targets Windows users. It tricks the users into thinking that it is a
legitimate hardware monitoring tool (SMART). It generates fake messages indicat-
ing that the hard drive is failing and tries to convince the user to pay to fix the
supposed issues. It also disables antivirus software in the compromised system [20].
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• Winwebsec is a Windows Trojan that impersonates anti-malware software and dis-
plays fake messages stating that the user’s system has been infected. Once installed,
it tries to convince the user to pay for a fake anti-malware product [42].
• Zbot is another Trojan. Zbot steals confidential information such as online creden-
tials [36].
• Zeroaccess is a Trojan that attacks Windows systems. It uses a botnet to download
other malicious programs onto the compromised system [37].
Table 10 lists the number of files from each of the malware families used in our experi-
ments.
Table 10: Malware Files
Malware Family Number of Files
Cridex 50
Harebot 50
Security Shield 50
SmartHdd 50
Winwebsec 100
Zbot 100
Zeroaccess 100
For our representative benign dataset, we use the 20 Windows executable files listed
in Table 12. These executables are available in Windows 7 or as freeware.
7.3 Results
After performing each experiment, we plot the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve and compute area under the ROC curve (AUC). The ROC curve is obtained from
a scatterplot by graphing the true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate
(FPR) as the threshold varies through the range of possible values. The AUC can be
interpreted as the probability that a randomly-selected positive instance scores higher
than a randomly selected negative instance [8]. Consequently, an AUC of 1.0 represents
the ideal case where a threshold exists that results in no classification errors. On the
other hand, an AUC of 0.5 implies that the binary classifier is not better than flipping
a coin.
We first perform our analysis on seven malware families using both static and dy-
namic analysis techniques based on HMMs. We then plot the ROC for each case and
calculate the AUC. To perform a comparison on both the techniques, we have chosen the
same data set in both cases. We now consider a single family and examine the results.
For the Security Shield family, Figure 4 (a) shows the scatterplot for the static
HMM based on extracted opcode sequences. The corresponding ROC curve appears in
Figure 4 (c). The ROC curve in Figure 4 (c) yields an AUC of 0.676.
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Table 11: Benign files
No. Benign file
1 bdaycontrol.exe
2 IRATrack.exe
3 MineSweeper.exe
4 SpiderSolitaire.exe
5 PurblePlace.exe
6 FreeCell.exe
7 Chess.exe
8 7zFM.exe
9 hh.exe
10 Mahjong.exe
11 DVDMaker.exe
12 datewiz.exe
13 winhlp32.exe
14 bdaycheck.exe
15 setup.exe
16 Countdown Pro.exe
17 unins000.exe
18 bckgzm.exe
19 nanoclock.exe
20 shvlzm.exe
Again for the Security Shield family, the scatterplot for the dynamic HMM based on
extracted API call sequences is given in Figure 4 (b). The corresponding ROC curve
appears in Figure 4 (d), which has an AUC of 1.0.
HMMs based on static opcode sequences have performed well when tested on various
malware families [1, 31, 43]. The AUC of 0.676 for the static HMM indicates that the
Security Shield represents a challenging detection problem This makes the AUC of 1.0
for the dynamic HMM all the more impressive.
We have performed experiments on each of the seven malware families discussed in
Section 7.2. For each family, we have tested an HMM based on static opcodes and
both an HMM and PHMM based on dynamic API calls. The results for the static and
dynamic HMMs are summarized in Table 12. The ROC curves for the six families other
than Security Shield are given in the Appendix.
From the results in Table 12 we see that the dynamic HMM outperforms the static
HMM in every case, except for the Smart HDD family, in which case both the static
and dynamic HMMs perform very well. The average AUC for the dynamic HMM cases
is 0.976, whereas the average AUC for the static HMM cases is 0.785. This clearly shows
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Figure 4: Security Shield HMM Results
the advantage of dynamic birthmarks.
Next, we consider PHMMs trained on the same dynamic birthmarks used for the
dynamic HMMs. For a PHMM, the number of sequences used to train is a critical
parameter. Table 13 contains results for our PHMM experiments, where “group n”
means that we trained the corresponding PHMM using n sequences. In each case, we
were able to achieve an AUC of 1.0, and once we have attained such a result, there is
no need for further experimentation with the parameter n.
The PHMM results in Table 13 may be somewhat surprising when compared to
PHMM results obtained in previous research. For example, in the paper [3], a PHMM
is trained on static opcode sequences from metamorphic malware families. The PHMM
results in [3] are significantly worse than those obtained from HMMs trained on the
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Table 12: AUC Curve Results for Static and Dynamic HMMs
AUC
Malware family Dynamic Static
Cridex 0.964 0.596
Harebot 0.974 0.622
Security Shield 1.000 0.676
SmartHdd 0.980 0.996
Winwebsec 0.985 0.835
Zbot 0.990 0.847
Zeroaccess 0.979 0.923
Table 13: PHMM Results
Malware Family
AUC Results
group 5 group 10 group 15 group 20 group 30
Cridex 0.958 1.000 — — —
Harebot 0.875 0.952 1.000 — —
Security Shield 0.988 0.964 1.000 — —
SmartHdd 0.812 0.905 0.963 1.000 —
Winwebsec 0.997 0.995 1.000 — —
Zbot 0.915 0.970 1.000 — —
Zeroaccess 0.905 0.988 0.968 0.975 1.000
same static opcode data. Apparently, this is due to obfuscations that cause opcode
sequences to be shifted to different locations within the binaries, causing gaps to prolif-
erate when constructing the PHMMs, and thereby weakening the models. In contrast,
for the dynamic API calls considered in this research it is far more difficult to obfuscate
the sequential information. That is, the positional information in API call sequences is
highly informative, whereas the positional information in opcode sequences is much less
so.
Finally, in Figure we compare the results for our static HMM, dynamic HMM, and
dynamic PHMM, in the form of a bar graph. While the dynamic HMM results are
indeed very strong, the PHMM result cannot be improved.
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Figure 5: PHMM versus HMMs
8 Conclusion and Future work
As malware has become increasingly difficult to detect with traditional techniques, new
approaches are needed, and machine learning based tools seem a promising avenue.
Hidden Markov models are one such technique that has been used effectively for malware
detection in previous work [1, 4, 19, 21, 26, 31, 43]. In contrast, Profile Hidden Markov
Models seem to have rarely been studied in this context, with previous results being
mixed, at best [3].
In this paper, we have shown the efficacy of detection tools using HMMs built from
dynamic birthmarks; specifically API calls. In fact, this dynamic approach far outper-
forms previous static analysis tools that relied on HMMs based on opcodes as static
birthmarks. The average area under the ROC curve (AUC) that we obtained for all
malware families in our dataset using our dynamic HMMs was 0.976, while the average
AUC using static HMMs was 0.785. The static HMMs have shown strong results in sev-
eral previous studies, which indicates that our dataset presents a relatively challenging
case. This makes the dynamic HMM results all the more impressive.
We also experimented with Profile Hidden Markov Models. The PHMM can be
28
viewed as a generalization of an HMM that take positional information into account.
Our PHMM experiments, based again on dynamic API call sequences, outperform the
HMMs in every case. In fact, the PHMMs achieved ideal separation in every case, with
an AUC of 1.0. These results show that PHMMs can be a very powerful tool for certain
types of software analysis problems.
For future work, we intend to further explore different morphing and obfuscation
techniques and test how effective our techniques are against different strategies. In
particular, it would be interesting to try to defeat HMM—and especially PHMM—
techniques that are based on dynamic API calls. By doing so, we can hope to strengthen
these detection techniques. Also, while the dynamic birthmarks considered in this paper
are based on API calls, other dynamic birthmarks might provide beneficial information.
We also note that a potential strategy could be to combine the API calls with other
types of dynamic birthmarks using, say, Support Vector Machines in order to develop
an even robust malware detection model. Finally, it would be interesting to test these
dynamic tools in the situation where we want to monitor untrusted code at runtime.
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Appendix
Here, we provide additional results from our experiments. Figure 6 (a) through (f) give
ROC curves of HMMs trained on static opcode sequences, for Cridex, Harebot, Smart
HDD, Winwebsec, Zbot, and Zeroaccess, respectively. The ROC curves of HMMs trained
on dynamic API call sequences are given in Figure 7 (a) through (f). The corresponding
results for Security Shield are given in Figure 4, parts (c) and (d).
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Figure 6: ROC Curves for HMMs Based on Static Birthmarks
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Figure 7: ROC Curves for HMMs Based on Dynamic Birthmarks
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